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Chapter 1
Introduction: Changing Retirement
Policies and Patterns in
Higher Education
Robert L. Clark and P. Brett Hammond

As the new century begins, the tectonics of the faculty labor market are shifting rapidly. The aftershocks of these movements are challenging colleges
and universities to confront a wide range of faculty resource and compensation policies. This book focuses on retirement and retirement policies—the
back end of the labor market, but it is this end that drives or deeply aﬀects
such issues as new faculty hiring, the ability of colleges and universities to
change the direction of teaching and research, and the age structure of the
faculty. The reason for such a focus is that we are now gaining experience
with what to do about a fundamental shift in the retirement rules: the end
of mandatory retirement.
Until 1994, mandatory retirement was an integral component of human
resource policy for academic personnel at most of the nation’s colleges and
universities, especially research institutions. On January 1, 1994, at the end
of a seven-year exemption, an amendment to the U.S. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) took eﬀect, ending mandatory retirement for
tenured faculty.1 At that moment, most colleges and universities confronted
a signiﬁcantly altered academic labor market, one in which tenured faculty
could not be required to retire at any speciﬁed age.
Higher education already faced some signiﬁcant academic personnel issues based on widespread concerns about three perceived trends: (1) a faculty ‘‘bulge’’—a disproportionate number of faculty hired in the 1960s and
early 1970s to teach the baby boomers and who are now approaching age
60; (2) a ‘‘surplus army’’—a large number of people who received doctoral
degrees in the past ten years compared to the number of academic job openings during that period; and (3) modest or no increases in higher education budgets (Bowen and Sosa 1989; Finkelstein, Seal, and Schuster 1998;
National Research Council 1993; Brewer, Gates, and Goldman 1998). To
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make matters worse, these trends in the higher education labor market were
thought to be concentrated in some ﬁelds—physics and English, for instance—more than others—for example, in computer sciences (National
Research Council 1998).
Therefore, on top of possible negative eﬀects of limited budget increases,
a faculty bulge, and a surplus doctorate army, elimination of mandatory retirement as a personnel policy raised several additional concerns among
academic administrators. First, many feared a decline in academic quality
if senior professors remained on the job past the traditional retirement age.
Second, these administrators anticipated a reduced ability to renew and
enrich their faculties by hiring either newly trained assistant professors or
senior professors with established reputations. Third, they expected a loss
in ﬂexibility to reallocate faculty positions to emerging areas of interest and
in response to shifts in student demand. Finally, they pondered the possibility of higher costs associated with retaining senior professors instead of
hiring newer, entry-level professors.
These management concerns contrast with the legitimate interest of faculty members in obtaining an employment right granted by Congress to almost all other American workers. This new right bestowed on individual faculty members an economic beneﬁt that they could exercise by choosing to
continue working past age 70 or by ‘‘selling’’ the beneﬁt back to the university in exchange for their earlier retirement. In comparison to earlier years,
universities could not force older faculty to retire, but they could continue
to oﬀer ﬁnancial incentives to encourage retirement at younger ages.
Before 1994, two major studies, by Hammond and Morgan (National Research Council 1991) and by Rees and Smith (1991), respectively, assessed
the likely impact of ending mandatory retirement in higher education.
These studies reached ﬁve major conclusions.
Retirement ages in higher education. Most faculty retired before reaching the
age of 70. Faculty at the majority of colleges and universities—institutions
where tenured faculty teach a relatively large number of courses each year
and have relatively less access to research funds, graduate students, and opportunities for publication—traditionally chose to retire well before age 70.
Through the 1980s, most faculty followed the trend in the American workforce toward voluntary retirement at earlier ages.
Retirement ages in research universities. A bunching of faculty retirement at
the required retirement age of 70 occurred primarily at the major research
universities. Faculty at research universities—institutions where tenured
faculty teach relatively few courses per year and have greater access to research funds, graduate students, and opportunities for publication—chose
to retire later than their colleagues elsewhere. At private research universities with mandatory retirement, about 35 percent of the faculty who retired did so at the mandatory retirement age, while at public universities
with mandatory retirement policies, about 18 percent retired at age 70. At
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a very small number of universities, more than 50 percent of faculty retired
right at age 70. These studies anticipated that the proportion of faculty who
continue to work past age 70 in a post-mandatory retirement world will be
related to the proportion who worked right up to age 70 prior to 1994.
Faculty performance and aging. These studies found no evidence that age
predicts professional vitality in college teaching or research. Instead, studies
on aging and performance show that variations in ability and competence
are greater within age groups than between age groups. Special studies of
higher education faculty teaching and research failed to show strong age
eﬀects among faculty who chose to keep working. Instead, there was evidence that negative feedback on research and teaching, at some institutions,
led to faculty self-selection (i.e., exit from employment).
Tenure and faculty dismissals. Despite having tenure, faculty could be, but
rarely are, dismissed for poor performance. The legal status of tenure
doesn’t prevent faculty dismissals for poor performance. Appropriate posttenure review programs can be used to provide incentives for faculty to
maintain a record of good performance, to encourage poor performers
to improve or leave the institution, and to dismiss poor performers who
neither improve or leave on their own. Some institutions have instituted serious posttenure review. The obstacles for those who haven’t are more often
anthropological than legal.
Retirement incentive programs. Retirement incentive programs could induce
faculty to retire earlier. Designed well, phased or early retirement incentive programs have aﬀected faculty retirement in the past. Speciﬁc tools
include cash payments, pension credits, part-time teaching, and continuing access to campus facilities (e.g., library card, parking, oﬃce space, and
other perquisites). Costs of speciﬁc programs vary widely; high-cost incentive programs can be a signiﬁcant portion of an institution’s faculty compensation budget. But in the past, the uncertain legal status of retirement incentive programs—particularly upper age limits in what are called ‘‘window
plans’’—have dampened their use.
In summary, the studies reported that the eﬀects of ending mandatory retirement would impose signiﬁcant costs on the nation’s research universities
and to a lesser extent on other colleges and universities.They also noted that
retirement incentive programs and related programs were eﬀective tools to
deal with issues aﬀecting the broadest swath of institutions, including limited budgets and labor market trends. Consequently, these studies recommended that mandatory retirement should be allowed to lapse, as long as
Congress legally enabled all colleges and universities to use tools, such as
age-based retirement incentive programs, that would enable institutions to
provide positive incentives for faculty to elect early retirement.
Since these reports were issued, there has been no systematic follow-up.
Based on individual campus-level experience, but without the opportunity
to compare across campuses or to obtain national data, some academic ad-
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ministrators have become increasingly concerned that older professors are
in fact remaining on the job too long. Many are worried that delayed retirement is already adversely aﬀecting the academic quality and ﬁnancial condition of their institutions. And these concerns are compounded by what
administrators report to be an increasing age structure at many colleges and
universities as well as uncertainty about future institutional revenues and
costs.
Some institutions, particularly private colleges and universities, have
found that beneﬁts and age discrimination laws have tied their hands by
inhibiting them from instituting age-based retirement incentives. In September 1998, as part of the Higher Education Act reauthorization, Congress
passed legislation allowing all higher education institutions to use certain
types of age-based retirement incentives, speciﬁcally incentives that expire
when a faculty members reaches a certain age, but there has been as yet little
attention given to this new law.
Thus, there is a strong and growing need for a national discussion of these
concerns, an examination of new evidence that might bear on them, and
a consideration of newly available practical options for colleges and universities. This book addresses these important issues. The analysis outlines
the critical issues associated with ending mandatory retirement in higher
education and examines reasons for changes in age-speciﬁc patterns of faculty retirement. Research presented in this volume shows what the eﬀects of
these changes are, how they interact with other trends in higher education,
and where they have been most severe. Several chapters analyze appropriate
use of retirement incentive programs and other methods of increasing faculty turnover. Throughout this examination of the changing academic labor
market, the discussion reﬂects the current thinking of key academic administrators, faculty groups, and other expert policymakers and practitioners—
all of whom share an interest in determining the extent of any problems
that have been caused by changes in retirement behavior and what new policies, if any, are needed. This debate is shown through a series of chapters by
leading thinkers on retirement patterns, policies, and programs in higher
education.2

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Employment Rights and Retirement in Higher Education
Until the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and its
amendments, human resources policy in most institutions of higher education had two basic elements: the tenure system, which provided faculty
members considerable protection against loss of employment, and mandatory retirement, which required professors to relinquish tenure along with
their job rights at a predetermined age.
Compensation systems and retirement programs were developed around
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these two basic features of the academic labor market. At many institutions,
regular increases in salary with years of service implied that older professors
would be paid more than younger faculty. The design of retirement plans reﬂected the assumption that retirement would occur at or before the mandatory retirement age.
One implication of a system based on tenure and mandatory retirement
was that at many institutions, while pretenure review was quite rigorous,
posttenure review was less so. Tenured faculty members were (and are) only
rarely dismissed for lack of professional productivity. Prior to 1994, mandatory retirement could serve as a relatively uncontroversial means to ensure
an endpoint for an academic career that had been less than fully successful.3
An important, unresolved question is whether less rigorous posttenure
review was in fact a result of mandatory retirement policies. If the existence
of mandatory retirement was the primary explanation for less rigorous posttenure review, then the elimination of mandatory retirement rules should
lead to changes in the review process on many campuses. Alternatively, less
rigorous posttenure review might also be consequence of other aspects of
the ‘‘culture’’ of higher education, including collegial governance. If the academic culture is the stronger explanatory factor, then the end of mandatory
retirement might not be accompanied by any changes in posttenure review
processes.
The end of mandatory retirement essentially awarded the current cohort
of older professors an unanticipated new property right—albeit one that was
already enjoyed by almost all other American workers—the right to remain
on the job until they decided to retire, regardless of their age. To the extent
that professors exercise this new right, their behavior will directly aﬀect the
faculty age structure and labor costs at their institutions.
A review of the current size and age structure of the academic labor force
indicates the key importance of retirement policy (Bowen and Sosa 1989;
Atkinson 1990; Finkelstein, Seal, and Schuster 1998). Because most colleges
and universities are long past the growth years of the 1960s and early 1970s,
employment opportunities for newly trained Ph.D.s in most ﬁelds are created when older faculty retire and vacate their academic positions. If older
faculty remain on the job, fewer vacancies occur, and thus fewer new assistant professors are hired.
Examination of the current age structure of the academic labor force indicates that retirement policy will become a more important issue in the
next ten to ﬁfteen years. During this period, the relatively large number of
faculty hired in the late 1960s and early 1970s will begin reaching the traditional retirement ages. To date, any decline in age-speciﬁc retirement rates
has resulted in only a few additional faculty members remaining on the job,
because a relatively small number of professors are currently in their 60s
and 70s. However, a much larger number of professors will attain these ages
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within the next two decades. As a result, any future decline in retirement
rates will have a more signiﬁcant eﬀect on new employment opportunities
at many universities.
Many academic administrators fear that a decline in retirement rates will
adversely aﬀect the cost or academic quality of their institutions. Institutions can elect to counter declines in retirement rates with the use of early
and phased retirement programs that oﬀer a ﬁnancial incentive for older
professors to retire. In eﬀect, such programs allow the institution to buy
back the new employment right from older professors.When designing such
early retirement programs, administrators must decide whether the gain to
the institution of having older professors retire is outweighed by the added
ﬁnancial cost of the early retirement option.

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Is the Age of Retirement Increasing?
National-level information about the length of faculty careers is indicative,
but far from deﬁnitive. The National Research Council has been collecting
sample survey information about the oldest Ph.D. holders for less than a decade, but a separate analysis of faculty is not available. Similarly,TIAA-CREF
data indicate that today’s higher education and research institution employees exhibit a bifurcated pattern; some begin receiving retirement income
much earlier while others do so much later than their predecessors, but an
analysis of the faculty is not available. Developments like these have caused
concern among administrators that a large number of professors might work
well past age 70 in response to the end of mandatory retirement.
To examine changing retirement patterns in depth, Orley Ashenfelter and
David Card (1998) conducted a preliminary study that focuses on faculty
retirement decisions using employment records from a national sample of
colleges and universities. They compiled employment records from thirtyseven institutions, consisting of eleven research universities, three degreegranting institutions, thirteen comprehensive colleges, and ten liberal arts
colleges for the years 1986–1995.4 They used these data to examine the work
and retirement decisions of a sample of 5,035 faculty members employed
at these thirty-seven institutions who are age 50 or older. In addition to the
employment records of this sample of faculty members, the researchers obtained the value of retirement funds for those persons who were TIAA-CREF
participants.5 They oﬀered a preliminary report from an ongoing project
that includes an eﬀort to expand the number of colleges and universities in
the sample to over one hundred.
Ashenfelter and Card use these data to estimate parameters in a model of
an individual’s decision to retire at any speciﬁc age, both before and after the
ending of mandatory retirement. They reached the following conclusions:
End of mandatory retirement. In the mandatory retirement era, about 20 percent of faculty who reached age 70 were forced to retire and 40 percent vol-

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 15 of 186

Introduction

7

T 1. Tenure Track Faculty Retirement Rates at Age 70 by Cause:
Preliminary Results for Sample of 37 Institutions
Period

Number of
Voluntary
Mandatory
Other
observations retirement (%) retirement (%) reasons (%)

All institutions
Mandatory (1986–93)
Post-mandatory (1994–95)
Change

510
140
—

40.8
29.7
−11.1

22.0
2.0
−19.9

2.4
2.0
−0.3

Research institutions only
Mandatory (1986–93)
Post-mandatory (1994–95)
Change

413
110
—

42.6
25.5
17.2

22.0
2.7
−19.3

1.9
2.7
−0.8

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Source: Ashenfelter and Card (1998), Table 6.
Those not retired at age 70 in the mandatory retirement period were retired the next year.

untarily retired at age 70. After the elimination of mandatory retirement,
the fraction of faculty retiring at age 70 declined sharply. The retirement
rate at age 70 is now similar to the retirement rates at ages 68 and 69.
Research universities. Faculty at research universities have signiﬁcantly
lower retirement rates than faculty at other types of institutions. Faculty with
higher salaries are less likely to retire; a 10 percent higher salary results in a
0.6 percentage point reduction in the probability of retirement. Retirement
rates didn’t vary signiﬁcantly by gender or race.
Pension wealth. Among faculty covered by TIAA-CREF, a 10 percent increase in the value of the individual’s total TIAA-CREF account balance at
age 67 increased the likelihood of retirement by 0.1 percentage points from
12.0 percent to 12.1 percent. During the 1990s, the retirement rate of faculty in their 60s rose. This might be due to the unanticipated increase in the
values of TIAA-CREF retirement accounts associated with relatively high
rates of returns during this period.
Table 1 is drawn from Ashenfelter and Card and shows the national decline in retirement rates of faculty who work until age 70. Before elimination
of mandatory retirement, about 65 percent of faculty turning age 70 retired
that year (virtually all of those that did not retire then were forced to retire
the next year by the mandatory retirement rules). Following elimination of
mandatory retirement in 1994, only 34 percent of faculty reaching age 70
at all institutions (about 31 percent at research universities) retired.
In Chapter 2 of this volume, Robert Clark, Linda Ghent, and Juanita
Kreps present their estimates of how age-speciﬁc retirement rates have
changed at three North Carolina universities. They examine data on faculty retirement decisions, speciﬁcally the 1988–97 employment records of
Duke University, the University of North Carolina (UNC), and North Caro-
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lina (NC) State University.They reached conclusions that are consistent with
the ﬁndings of Ashenfelter and Card:
Retirement age. Between 1988 and 1997, the average age of faculty members at each of these universities increased by over 2 years with the mean
overall age for the faculties increasing from 46.5 years to 49 years. The proportion of the faculty less than 40 years of age decreased from 27 percent
to 18 percent between 1988 and 1997, while the proportion aged 55 years
and older rose from 24 percent to 29 percent. This aging was the result of
both an increase in the average age of new faculty, as well as a decline in
retirement rates among existing faculty at all ages.
End of mandatory retirement. Retirement rates for persons reaching the
mandatory retirement age declined sharply following the end of mandatory
retirement. Retirement rates for persons age 69 at the beginning of the academic year fell from 61 percent to 38 percent after the elimination of mandatory retirement. The retirement rate for those age 70 at the beginning of
the academic year dropped from 77 percent before 1994 to 13 percent after
1994. These ﬁgures are even more dramatic than the national-level data reported by Ashenfelter and Card.
Pension plan. Faculty who participated in the Teachers and State Employees Retirement Plan (a deﬁned beneﬁt plan available only to faculty at NC
State and UNC) were 10 percentage points more likely to retire at any age
than participants in one of the deﬁned contributions (including TIAACREF) oﬀered by the three universities. After the elimination of mandatory
retirement, predicted retirement rates declined for persons in the state retirement plan but increased for those in one of the deﬁned contribution
plans. This ﬁnding is consistent with the observation of Ashenfelter and
Card that participants in TIAA-CREF were more likely to retire during the
1990s and this might be associated with unanticipated increases in account
balances.
Based on both of these preliminary studies, ending mandatory retirement
has had an observable eﬀect on the retirement decisions of faculty, especially at research universities, where professors who reach age 70 are less
likely to retire now than before 1994. This eﬀect is tempered by an recent increase in the retirement rate for all faculty in their 60s, so that fewer faculty
reach age 70 than in the past.

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Legal Status of Retirement Incentive Programs
Since colleges and universities can no longer rely on mandatory retirement
policies to force retirement, they must now look to voluntary retirement incentive programs if they wish to aﬀect faculty retirement decisions. One of
the most critical issues aﬀecting colleges and universities with deﬁned contribution pension plans, especially those in the private sector, is the changing legal status of retirement incentive programs. In Chapter 3, David Raish
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analyzes the legal issues associated with retirement and retirement incentive
programs in higher education.
In conjunction with deﬁned beneﬁt pensions, retirement incentive programs are clearly legal and have been used frequently by public sector colleges and universities to provide inducements to increase faculty retirement
rates. In this setting, formal retirement incentive programs are most often
part of a public-sector pension plan and therefore not subject to Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) requirements. Such programs can
also take advantage of age-based formulas already built into deﬁned beneﬁt plans, which can also be modiﬁed to accommodate increased retirement
incentives.
Since most (though certainly not all) deﬁned contribution plans are offered by private colleges and universities, until recently they were often subject to ERISA and ADEA rules and regulations eﬀectively limiting the use of
certain policies, such as those associated with upper age limits. In addition,
because of the way in which deﬁned contribution beneﬁts are structured,
these pensions do not typically or explicitly link beneﬁt payout streams to
age.6
The nature of most deﬁned contribution plans—namely, that there is no
age-related beneﬁt that can be altered to provide a retirement incentive—
presents additional challenges for an employer who wishes to target retirement incentives at a key group of professors within a speciﬁc age bracket.
For example, a promise to provide faculty of any age an incentive payment
would allow recipients to wait until they would have retired anyway and still
receive the payment. Thus, for these professors it would no longer act as an
incentive to retire early.
Therefore, in order to be eﬀective as well as economical, retirement incentive programs must induce a suﬃcient number of faculty to retire before
they might otherwise do so, thus freeing up salary dollars to be used for replacement hiring. Consequently, retirement incentive programs oﬀering a
lump sum payment are thought to work well when faculty can be oﬀered
an age window during which they are eligible to apply for the retirement
incentive.
Until recently, the legal status of including an upper age limit in such
a program was cloudy. In the past, some experts argued that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibited oﬀering retirement incentives
to younger employees and not to older employees. ADEA clearly permits
oﬀering retirement incentives to older employees but not to younger employees. Therefore, some believed that a deﬁned contribution window program could have a lower age limit, but not an upper one, thus eﬀectively
keeping the window of opportunity open forever for faculty who are over
the initial age threshold. Others believed that an upper age limit is permissible for a retirement incentive program used with a deﬁned contribution
pension. Without clariﬁcation of this issue, many colleges and universities
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believed that they would have to oﬀer retirement incentive payments to all
faculty over a certain age and further believe that this outcome would be
ineﬀective, costly, and self-defeating.
Compromise legislation intended to address these issues was proposed
several times during the 1990s and received support from most of the private and public interest groups concerned with higher education and aging,
as well as from the appropriate congressional committees. This legislation,
which ﬁnally passed in September 1998, provides a safe harbor allowing colleges and universities to oﬀer, with certain signiﬁcant restrictions, retirement incentive programs with an upper age limit. Such a limit would enable
all college or university employees who reach an initial threshold, for example age 60, to pass through a window of opportunity during which they
could choose to apply for retirement incentives. However, once they pass
beyond the upper limit, for example age 65, they would no longer be eligible for the program. The new legislation also requires that any retirement
incentive program be oﬀered for a suﬃcient time period so that all employees can become aware of the program’s details and have the opportunity to
consider their options carefully.
In January 2000, the Supreme Court somewhat limited court protection
for the safe harbor for retirement incentive programs as they apply to public
employees. Public colleges and universities may still oﬀer such incentives,
especially in connection with deﬁned beneﬁt plans. Public sector deﬁned
contribution-based retirement incentive plans with upper age limits may
still enjoy safe harbor protection through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Raish outlines current ADEA, ERISA, and state laws that pertain to the
safe harbor provision, an important tool that has been available to other
U.S. employers and employees and is now available to private colleges, universities, and faculty. Such a change enables college and universities that
ﬁnd they are suﬀering or will suﬀer negative consequences from the end
of retirement to oﬀer clearly legal, cost-eﬀective programs focused on the
problems they have encountered.

Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Design and Use of Retirement Incentive Programs
Individual campus experience with retirement incentive programs reﬂects
each college and university’s unique circumstances as well as factors that
are common to many institutions. In Chapter 4, John Keefe evaluates the
current understanding and use of retirement incentive programs in higher
education. Keefe surveyed private and public institutions, with special attention given to research universities and liberal arts colleges. The survey
focused on plans in which faculty receive severance payments as an incentive to retire as well as on phased retirement plans in which senior faculty are
oﬀered part-time work at prorated salaries in exchange for giving up tenure

6140 Clark / TO RETIRE OR NOT / sheet 19 of 186
Tseng 2000.8.18 14:02 OCV:0

Introduction

11

and retiring. Keefe approached 125 institutions and received responses from
sixty-six institutions on seventy-seven diﬀerent plans. Eighty percent of the
responding institutions currently oﬀer an early retirement or have done so
within the past few years.
Under the incentive plans, the amount of the severance payments at private institutions vary from 40 percent of ﬁnal salary to 200 percent of ﬁnal
salary with most of these institutions oﬀering between 100 and 200 percent
of ﬁnal salary. Payments by public institutions were smaller, ranging from 12
percent to 100 percent of ﬁnal salary. Most plans provided for a single lump
sum payment.
Phased retirement plans vary considerably across institutions, based on
the duration of the contract, the amount of work, and the relationship between workload reduction and salary reduction. Both incentive and phased
retirement plans can be either formal (oﬀered through a documented process whose details are well known to the faculty) and informal (often undocumented and oﬀered by administrators to selected individual faculty
members with details that vary according to each case).
Retirement incentive plans can be ongoing programs or they can be offered only for a speciﬁed time period. Legally, an ongoing program is subject to being declared an employment beneﬁt like the basic pension plan. If
so, it becomes subject to ERISA and other employee beneﬁt rules and laws.
Ongoing programs are, for example, diﬃcult to withdraw without appropriate notiﬁcation, and they must be fully funded. In contrast, a time-limited
program is designed to end and therefore is not considered to be a beneﬁt
subject to ERISA and other employee beneﬁt rules and regulations.
Some institutions attempt to respond to short-term faculty retirement
issues by introducing a temporary incentive plan to induce an immediate,
one-time reduction in staﬀ. Other institutions introduce ongoing plans in
an eﬀort to permanently raise age-speciﬁc retirement rates. Sixty of the
seventy-seven plans in the survey were ongoing and seventeen were temporary plans. Most of the temporary plans were oﬀered at public institutions.
The objective of most of these plans was to entice individuals to retire before age 65, well below the former mandatory retirement age of 70. Most
important, Keefe found that virtually all of the institutions did not mention mandatory retirement as a reason for the introduction of retirement
incentive plans. In fact, only one institution speciﬁcally indicated that it had
adopted an incentive plan in response to the elimination of mandatory retirement.
Window plans oﬀer special retirement options that are available only for
a short period of time and/or to people between certain ages. Used in conjunction with a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan, window plans typically treat
participants as if they were older or had more years of service in the calculation of pension beneﬁts. Of course, and especially in conjunction with a
deﬁned contribution pension plan, window plans can also simply oﬀer cash
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payments for faculty members who retire within the designated time frame.
For the most part, the primary objective of window plans is to achieve a
short-term increase in retirements consistent with an institution’s attempt
to reduce the size of its faculty or to redress a signiﬁcant problem in the
composition of its faculty. These plans are less likely to be adopted to solve
long-term problems associated with later retirements.
In addition to observing national patterns in the use of retirement incentive programs, it is important to know how knowledgeable administrators
on individual campuses are matching incentives to the faculty employment
and retirement challenges they face. In a series of chapters, researchers and
administrators who participated in the design of retirement incentive programs at Cornell University, the University of California, the University of
Wisconsin, and the University of Virginia examine the experience in depth.
In Chapter 5, Ronald Ehrenberg, Michael Matier, and David Fontanella
analyze Cornell University’s response to the end of mandatory retirement.
Cornell is a unique institution with six of its colleges privately funded and
four colleges operated by Cornell under contract with the State of New York.
All faculty in the six privately funded colleges are enrolled in a deﬁned contribution retirement program, while faculty in other colleges have a choice
of participating in a state deﬁned beneﬁt retirement plan or an optional retirement program.7
In the fall of 1996, a joint faculty-administrative committee was appointed
to make recommendations on how Cornell should respond to the elimination of mandatory retirement. The committee began by examining employment records, which indicated that the average age of retirement ﬂuctuated
without trend until 1993–94, but since rose by two years. In addition, some
faculty who reached age 70 during this period remained on the job.8 Fewer
retirements reduced hiring opportunities and resulted in an aging of the
faculty. The proportion of all faculty under the age of 35 declined from 15
percent in 1982–83 to 5 percent in 1996–97. The percent of the faculty over
the age of 60 increased from 13 to 21 percent during the same period. The
number of newly hired, tenure-track faculty declined from 108 in 1987–88
to 48 in 1995–96. The committee determined that the decline in hiring had
three adverse eﬀects: (1) Cornell was hiring fewer faculty with new ideas and
new perspectives; (2) fewer new hires meant the university was less able to
diversify its faculty along gender, racial, and ethnic lines; and (3) fewer new
hires had the potential to limit Cornell’s ability to remain at the frontier in
rapidly changing ﬁelds and to shift faculty resources into new areas of inquiry.
As it began its deliberations, the committee was instructed by the provost to avoid a buyout plan because of the belief that these plans would not
be cost eﬀective. Since a majority of Cornell faculty members retire before
age 70, the worry was that any plan that paid people to retire prior to age
70 would be paying many people to do what they would have done anyway.
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Moreover, the legal status of deﬁned contribution-based buyout plans that
limited participation to faculty prior to a certain age was thought to be ambiguous.
Instead, the committee made a series of other recommendations to increase retirement rates: (1) faculty should be provided ﬁnancial planning assistance over their life cycles to assure that they make informed investment
decisions with their retirement accounts; (2) more information should be
available about the importance of investing in tax-deferred supplementary
retirement accounts; (3) faculty should be encouraged to discuss their retirement plans beforehand with department chairs or college oﬃcials to enable academic units to improve their planning; (4) salary increases should be
linked to individual productivity; (5) the status of emeriti professors should
be enhanced; (6) university retirement contributions to the deﬁned contribution plans should be capped; and (7) the existing phased retirement
program should be expanded.
The Cornell faculty objected to several of the key points in these recommendations. Speciﬁc arguments were that the recommendation to match
salary increases to productivity was oﬀensive and should be deleted; the
phased retirement program was not generous enough and it should be
amended; and capping retirement contributions was merely an attempt to
cut compensation and should be eliminated. The committee report was
been amended to reﬂect these criticisms at the time of publication the plan
was under consideration in the oﬃce of the provost.
In Chapter 6, Ellen Switkes looks at one of the largest retirement incentive
plans in higher education, the three Voluntary Early Retirement Programs
(VERIPs) adopted by the University of California (UC) in the early 1990s.
Faced with a disproportionate share of the UC faculty over the age of 55,
a state budget crunch, and the immanent elimination of mandatory retirement at what some consider the nation’s premier public research university
system, administrators designed a retirement incentive plan that used the
university’s overfunded deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan to bear most of the
cost of the incentive plan.
Each of the three VERIPs involved increasing the annual retirement income to which the faculty member was entitled. It did so by adding years
of service to the pension formula used to calculate retirement income, thus
increasing the faculty member’s proportion of ﬁnal income. In order to target certain age groups, more or fewer years were added, depending on the
faculty member’s age.
Each VERIP was more generous than the last. But the response did not entirely parallel the program’s generosity (for another perspective, see Pencavel 1997). In response to the ﬁrst plan, which was introduced in 1990, 31
percent of eligible faculty accepted early retirement. The second early retirement plan, which followed in 1992, provided more generous beneﬁts and
extended the boundaries of eligibility to older faculty. Only 18 percent of
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eligible faculty accepted the early retirement oﬀer. The ﬁnal plan was even
more generous, and 33 percent of eligible employees took early retirement
in response to this last oﬀer.
The response to these early retirement oﬀers by UC provides an especially
useful view of how employee expectations inﬂuence acceptance rates. The
ﬁrst oﬀer was almost unprecedented and was billed as a one-time event and
not to be repeated. The second oﬀer was also publicized as a last chance,
but employees apparently felt they could hold out for another round. In
the third instance, word passed among the faculty that there truly would be
no future oﬀer this time, likely contributing to the highest acceptance rate
of all.
In Chapter 7 Robert O’Neil provides a unique perspective on the eﬀects
of ending mandatory retirement. He is former president of the University
of Wisconsin and the University of Virginia. He was also a member of the
1989–91 National Research Council Committee on Ending Mandatory Retirement in Higher Education. O’Neil presided over the Wisconsin and Virginia campuses when mandatory retirement was eliminated. He outlines the
transition that each institution made to ending of mandatory retirement and
other forces that aﬀected both faculty behavior and policy choices available
to each institutions. He strongly supports the need for joint planning between administrators and faculty.
In light of the intended and potential unintended incentives associated
with retirement incentive programs, in Chapter 8, John Keefe analyzes these
programs from the point of view of a faculty member who must decide on
the beneﬁts and opportunity costs of continuing to work or accepting the
oﬀer. He concludes that the intangible elements of retirement incentive
programs, including the nonmonetary aspects, can be critical in the ultimate success of these programs. College and university administrators and
faculty would be wise to consider issues such as access to campus facilities,
professional status, and similar postretirement issues when formulating retirement incentive programs.
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Assessment of Research Findings
A major contribution of this volume is the critical assessment of current and
past research on faculty retirement and the identiﬁcation of unsettled research questions. Some of the foremost authorities on faculty retirement decisions, the ending of mandatory retirement, and the state of the academic
labor contributed summary assessments concerning faculty retirement in
the twenty-ﬁrst century.
An important question about faculty retirement behavior in response to
the ending of mandatory retirement is whether current ex post patterns are
surprising compared to anticipated or ex ante eﬀects. In Chapter 9, Sharon
Smith examines the research that predicted changes in retirement behav-
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ior before the end of mandatory retirement and compares it to the results
of the Ashenfelter and Card study and the Clark et al. study of retirement
rates and age structure. She concludes that recent patterns are not surprising and that college and university retirement policies should be based on
hard analysis of the circumstances facing each institution rather than on beliefs or attitudes. In particular, spending on retirement incentive programs
should be undertaken only in response to a clear analysis of faculty demographics and retirement behavior so that such expenditures will be targeted
on a clear need.
In addition to the question of changing retirement behavior and the implementation of retirement incentive programs, colleges and universities
face other critical issues associated with faculty retirement. Karen Holden
and Lee Hansen analyze several of these issues in Chapter 10. They review
the ﬁndings of their study of faculty retirement completed prior to the increase in mandatory retirement age that took eﬀect in 1982. They compare
these ﬁndings to the results reported in this volume.
From these chapters the following conclusions emerge:
Consensus. Views vary among institutions and between faculty and administrators on the impact of ending mandatory retirement. This variation
suggests that individual campuses are diﬀerentially aﬀected and therefore
should examine their own circumstances carefully before choosing future
retirement-related policies.
Incentive programs. Most representatives of higher education faculty and
administrators believe that ending mandatory retirement has beneﬁted faculty who can now exercise choices available to all other working Americans.
However, they both recognize that for planning and budgeting purposes,
individual campuses and multicampus systems may need to decrease the
uncertainty associated with future retirement patterns by oﬀering individuals the opportunity to retire earlier than they might otherwise choose to do
so. Therefore, both faculty and administrators support well-designed, noncoercive retirement incentive programs that increase certainty choice while
preserving individual rights.
National demographic trends. At the national level, projecting or predicting
future faculty supply and demand is next to impossible because forces aﬀecting this market cannot be fully speciﬁed. These include, but are not limited
to, future government support, industrial growth patterns, and immigration
policies and patterns. Conclusions about the eﬀects of ending mandatory
retirement for faculty must be placed in this uncertain context.
Awareness. Few colleges and universities are fully aware of what they can
and cannot do to provide retirement incentives to their employees. Education and information programs are needed in this regard, especially
now that the law aﬀecting retirement incentives in higher education has
changed.
The ﬁnal word is far from in on this subject.The consequences of eliminat-
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ing mandatory retirement have not yet been fully felt or understood. Additional studies and discussion of this issue and its eﬀect on higher education
are needed.

Guidance for Administrators and Faculty
Taken as a whole, this volume identiﬁes a series of important retirementrelated concerns and policies for dealing with those concerns:

Retirement Rates and Patterns
College and university faculties are aging. The surge of faculty hiring in the
1960s and early 1970s continues to dominate the academic labor market.
The aging of faculty hired to teach the baby boomers combined with smaller
cohorts of subsequently hired faculty are the primary cause of the aging of
the academic labor market. These trends show up in aggregate academic
labor market data as well as data on the faculties of particular colleges and
universities. There has been an increase in the average age of faculty members, a decrease in the proportion of the faculty members under age 40, and
an increase in the proportion of the faculty members over age 55.
The elimination of mandatory retirement has led to lower retirement rates for those
faculty members who continue to work until age 70. Although older professors
remaining at their university posts can be found at nearly all types of institutions, they are concentrated at research universities. In the past, these
professors would have been forced to retire. Now many of them are choosing
to remain as full-time, tenured faculty members for several additional years.
To date, the increase in retirement ages has played only a small role in the
aging of faculties. However, the declining probability of retirement among
older professors, particularly at research universities, will become more important in coming years as the relatively large number of faculty members
hired in the 1960s and early 1970s begins to reach traditional retirement
ages.
Future cohorts of retirees will look much diﬀerent from today’s. In the twenty-ﬁrst
century, faculties will include more minorities, more foreign-born scholars,
and more women. Future retirement decisions by these faculty are uncertain. Will they be similar to those of today’s older professors, who are predominately white men, or will they work longer? Academic administrators
should plan for the changing composition of their faculty and its impact on
retirement patterns. And institutions that have experienced, as many have,
a shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution pensions should be prepared for changes in how these programs aﬀect retirement decisions. Even
where pension plans haven’t changed, colleges and universities should also
prepare for the possibility that future cohorts will respond diﬀerently to the
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incentives to retire or to delay retirement that are built in—intentionally as
well as inadvertently—to pension plans and retirement incentive programs.
We also need a better understanding of the impact of the increase in stock
market values during the 1990s on the retirement decisions of participants
in deﬁned contribution pension plans. One study showed that observed retirement rates were higher for those with relatively large deﬁned contribution accumulations, but future retirement rates may be lower if, as is likely,
the next generation of older professors in deﬁned contribution plans do not
continue to beneﬁt from above-average equity returns.

Effects on Colleges and Universities
Later retirements can signiﬁcantly aﬀect colleges or universities. At institutions
where faculty size is not growing, retirements provide the major opportunity for new hiring. Academic institutions use these hiring opportunities to
revitalize teaching and research, reallocate faculty resources, reduce labor
costs, and stay on the cutting edge of rapidly changing educational opportunities. Decreases in retirement rates will inhibit new hiring and retard the
ability of institutions to achieve these goals. Institutions where the retirement age is increasing will experience a temporary sharp decline in hiring
and a less severe, long-term reduction in hiring due to the lengthening of
the average faculty career.
Disagreements among administrators and faculty and in the academic literature
regarding the impact of a larger number of older faculty members on colleges and universities have more than one source. Some of these disagreements are a result
of a lack of empirical information. We simply do not know whether or how
faculty retirement ages are changing on many individual campuses. Following the lead of some of the researchers who presented their ﬁndings at this
conference, individual schools should track retirement patterns at their own
campuses.
Much remaining disagreement regarding the impact of faculty aging is
normative. Even if retirement ages have, are, or will change at some universities, the question of whether these changes will harm their institutions remains. This answer may be a matter of perspective. Robert O’Neil, perhaps
the only former university president to experience retirement uncapping
at two institutions prior to 1994, points out that administrators are more
likely to focus on the ﬁnancial burdens associated with an older faculty and
fewer hiring opportunities due to the lengthening of faculty careers. Faculty groups are more likely to focus on the many positive contributions older
faculty can make to university life.
The most important conclusion here is that the empirical issues should be
separated from the normative issues. Empirical questions can be resolved as
much as possible through further research and discussion. The normative
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issues should be clearly identiﬁed and confronted through continuing discussions among faculty and administrators on campuses, in state capitols,
and in Washington.

Retirement Incentive Programs
Retirement incentive programs have been adopted by a large number of academic institutions and they come in many forms. They can be early retirement buyouts,
phased retirement programs, or increased generosity of retirement plans.
Limited evidence suggests that these plans can alter faculty retirement behavior; however, it is unclear how cost eﬀective these plans are. Much clearer
is the observation that few colleges and universities have targeted their use
of these programs to counteract the eﬀects of ending mandatory retirement.
The recent legislation enacting a safe harbor for design of certain types of retirement incentive programs has lifted a legal burden on many colleges and universities.
Current legislation now allows colleges and universities and their faculty members access to the same sorts of retirement incentives that were available in
businesses and in public colleges and universities.
The new safe harbor legislation should be accompanied by eﬀorts to increase awareness of retirement incentive programs. College and university associations have a
responsibility to help educate administrators and faculty about the options
and appropriate uses of retirement beneﬁt programs and retirement incentive programs in particular. Financial planning programs can help faculty
to better prepare for retirement, while education and communication between faculty and administrators concerning incentive plans improves the
success rate of most early retirement programs.
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Action and Assessment
Action and further needed analysis for the twenty-ﬁrst century will require cooperative, candid eﬀort on the part of researchers, administrators, and faculty. If we are to
understand the full impact of the end of mandatory retirement and faculty
aging on colleges and universities, better data is needed both for the academic labor market as a whole and for individual institutions. Analyses must
be conducted to document changes in faculty age structure and shifts in retirement patterns, determine the magnitude of potentially adverse eﬀects of
higher ages of retirement, and estimate the cost-eﬀectiveness of retirement
incentives programs adopted to deal with the consequences of mandatory
retirement.
But better research is not enough. All of the major constituents in higher
education must be willing to come together to develop and examine the evidence, formulate shared principles and conclusions based on the evidence,
and then promulgate policies and programs that address the challenges of
an aging faculty in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
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Notes
1. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was passed in 1967 forbidding discrimination against workers aged 40 to 65. This act explicitly permitted employers
to force workers to retire at age 65 without cause. This act was amended in 1978
raising the upper age of protected workers to 70. This prohibited mandatory retirement prior to the age of 70. Academic institutions were given an exemption from
this amendment until July 1, 1982. The ADEA was amended again in 1986, outlawing
the use of mandatory retirement at any age in most jobs. Once again, educational
institutions were given a temporary exemption until January 1, 1994, when the law
was extended to cover tenured faculty members.
2. Many of the following issues and ideas were ﬁrst summarized in Clark and Hammond (1998). Some of the material in this book was presented in preliminary form
at a 1998 conference in Washington, D.C. on the eﬀects of ending mandatory retirement, sponsored by TIAA-CREF and the College of Management, North Carolina
State University.
3. Tenure does not mean that professors cannot be terminated; however, the university must show that a professor is not performing at an acceptable level. Essentially, termination of a senior professor would require the university to show that
the person is incompetent or is not performing required job assignments. Across
the country, concern about these issues has produced an increasing trend toward
academic accountability and posttenure review. Even with the closer monitoring of
faculty performance, the termination of a senior faculty member will be a painful
task especially when the person has been a long-term, productive professor.
4. This study received support from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, with additional support and cooperation from TIAA-CREF. Throughout the study, Ashenfelter and Card and TIAA-CREF took a number of steps to ensure conﬁdentiality
and anonymity.The researchers obtained permission from TIAA-CREF and from the
human resources and/or beneﬁts oﬃce of each institution involved. They were provided a limited amount of data by the institutions and by TIAA-CREF, all of which was
carefully masked to preserve anonymity. As a result, the researchers and the sponsoring and participating organizations cannot identify any individual or institution
involved in the study.
5. However, there is no indication of the value of retirement beneﬁts for persons
not enrolled in TIAA-CREF. Faculty not enrolled in TIAA-CREF may be participants
in other deﬁned contribution plans or in deﬁned beneﬁt plans that are prevalent
among public institutions.
6. In a deﬁned contribution pension, retirement beneﬁts are not ﬁxed by any formula, but they do tend to increase with age. For example, many colleges and universities oﬀer employer contribution rates that increase with an employee’s age. Moreover, an individual’s retirement income typically increases with the length of time
contributions remain invested as well as with the actuarial eﬀect of any increase in a
person’s retirement age. Thus, other things being equal, the person who delays starting a lifetime annuity will receive higher annual retirement income than someone
who starts an annuity earlier.
7. Most new faculty have enrolled in a deﬁned contribution plan. Currently there
are fewer than twenty faculty in the state retirement plan.
8. Prior to 1994, Cornell rigorously enforced mandatory retirement; however, retired faculty were eligible to be hired back for speciﬁed terms on a part-time basis
at a renegotiated salary.
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